It’s important when discussing Irish policy to distinguish between things that there is a good argument for doing, and things that there are a good reason for doing. When it comes to abolishing Ireland’s so-called “triple lock” arrangement when it comes to deploying Irish troops, there is certainly a good argument, and one that the Government has not been shy about making in recent days. That argument is that the triple lock essentially gives foreign powers a veto over the sovereignty of the Irish state: If we are unable to deploy our troops to any part of the world without the express approval of the United Nations security council, then that grants the USA, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom a functional veto over Irish defense policy.
There is no reason, the argument goes, why any foreign power should have a veto over Irish defence policy.
As an argument, it is one where it is almost impossible to find a flaw. The only real counter-argument is that one does not trust the Irish Government (and by extension the Irish people who elect that Government), and actively prefers having the Chinese and the Russians decide where and when Irish troops go. This, though not in those exact words, is the effective argument being made by People before Profit, for example.
But a good argument for a change is not, as well all know, generally sufficient for Irish politicians to consider there to be a good reason to make a change. One need only look, for example, at the present state of Ireland’s immigration and asylum system for evidence of that: There are compelling arguments in favour of reforming that system to make Ireland a relatively less attractive place for migrants than it presently is – these have been articulated recently by those as exalted as the Taoiseach himself, and are widely held across the population. Still, no change is forthcoming. If every policy that had a good argument for implementation was simply implemented on that basis, we’d have no need for politics at all.
No: Politicians need a reason to do something. So what’s the Irish reason for scrapping the triple lock?
There is, of course, an official answer of sorts to that question and it involves the national capacity to rescue our own citizens from abroad. Consider a situation, politicians say, like that which occurred in Afghanistan amid the chaos of the US withdrawal: You could have Irish citizens stuck in a disaster zone with no way of getting home. We need, politicians say, to be able to deploy the army to the ground to help get our people out. At present, the claim is, we can’t do this without Russian or Chinese or EU approval.
As reasons go, this is relatively weak sauce: First, Ireland functionally lacks the capacity to effect such rescues, even if the triple lock was to go. Our air corps, at present, lacks the kind of transport plane that would be required.
Second, it is a reason which stretches the technical interpretation of the triple lock to breaking point: Is the Government truly arguing that China or Russia would block an Irish rescue mission for Irish people at the United Nations, and that the Irish Government would therefore have no choice but to leave our people stranded? This is nonsense: The triple lock could be abandoned in an afternoon if this scenario did arise, since it is simply Irish domestic policy and not some legally binding international treaty over which we could be sued in an international court. The best that can be said for this argument is that it answers, to a limited degree, the “why?” question. But it provides no answer at all to “why now?”
That leaves us with other potential possibilities: Were, for example, the state to be inclined to enter more fully into EU common defence arrangements, then the Triple Lock would clearly have to go. Those common defence arrangements are, by and large, targeted at increasing EU muscle relative to other major powers, including the aforementioned Chinese and Russians. It would make no sense were those two powers to retain any say over the deployment of troops under EU command.
If one was intending on going down that road, the Triple Lock would have to go. Neutrality, technically, could stay. But it would allow Irish troops to join other EU forces for exercises and joint training, which the Triple Lock does not at present permit.
This is not to say that this is the reason. But it is perhaps a more compelling potential reason than the weak and watery official reason that is being promulgated. And it is one to keep an eye on, whatever one’s view of neutrality is.