One of the reasons that the election of Donald Tusk in Poland in December was so much welcomed, and indeed given some practical assistance, by liberals outside of Poland was their confidence that he would reverse the policies of Law Justice (PiS) on immigration.
Not so apparently. Which is not surprising, because if we know anything about Donal Tusk it is that he is not exactly a conviction politician. Despite being embraced by EU and Foundation backers of left-liberalism, Tusk’s own party Civic Platform is “centre right,” if that means anything anymore. They are part of the same European People’s Party in the European Parliament as Fine Gael.
Like that party and many of its leaders, Tusk underwent a “journey” that saw him transform from being an opponent of abortion on demand, to supporting abortion up to 12 weeks. Anyone who believes that any of this, on Tusk’s part let me stress, represents anything other than political opportunism, would most likely be mistaken.
Unlike his position on abortion and other matters, however, Tusk’s current position on the Migration Pact is not that surprising, either in the context of Polish politics – Tusk’s tough posturing during the election campaign seemingly having been missed by most of the international media – and his previous statements on the issue.
Last week it was reported that Tusk had said that his government would not accept any “forced mechanism,” that would require that Poland would have to accept “illegal immigrants”. There is little doubt but that he was thinking more of domestic opinion rather than that of his western backers, or indeed of elements of his own coalition that embraces mutually conflicting views.
Although the referendum held on the same day as the general election last October did not reach a sufficient turnout on the four propositions to become binding, there was little doubt what the general view was regarding immigration. To the question related to the implications of the Migration Pact, an overwhelming 96.8% said ‘Nie.”

Tusk was President of the European Council between 2014 and 2019 when the EU was preparing the current policy that has been approved and now awaits final formal signing off before June’s European Parliament elections.
Tusk now claims that he was opposed to the “solidarity” aspects of the Pact that would require the acceptance of quotas, or in lieu of that what amounts to fines.
The original proposal had to be abandoned in 2017 largely because of the opposition of Hungary and of Tusk’s bitter enemies in PiS who were in power in Poland and totally rejected any proposal to force member states to accept quotas of people claiming asylum.
Tusk can legitimately point out that in 2016, when Greece was facing a major influx, that he explicitly warned what he himself described as “illegal economic migrants” not to attempt to enter any EU state: “Do not come to Europe. Do not believe the smugglers. Do not risk your lives and your money. It is all for nothing.”
Perhaps it is an example of how the Overton Window on illegal immigration has shifted so far that it is difficult to imagine either Tusk’s successor as President of the Council, Charles Michel – who ironically might be replaced by Viktor Orban through default following his unexpected resignation – or the Commission President. Ursula von der Leyen. taking effective action to halt the flow of illegal migrants.
Then again, neither did the EU under Tusk’s term in office although he did attract much criticism from more liberal elements for a note he sent to EU member states in late 2017. In that circular, Tusk expressed his opposition to mandatory quotas, which he described as “ineffective.” So, he does have some good form on the issue, regardless of his chameleon-like capacity to change to suit the prevailing conditions.
The question is whether Tusk will, in fact, hold the line and refuse to accept the Migration Pact. Much of the hopes for his election among the European and NGO liberal left was that a victory for Tusk would have isolated Hungary as the sole governmental opposition to the Pact.
That would appear to have been dashed, and some are now talking in terms of the Pact having been “torn up,” with Tusk now an effective ally of the liberal left’s bete noir. Hungary.
The stark terms of the Pact are that each state take at least 30,000 asylum seekers or pay a “fee” of €20,000 per head for each refusal below the quota. That detail might, ironically, actually save some states money given what we know of the costs of maintaining people who arrive as “economic migrants” but in a large number of cases become social welfare dependents.
Not only that, but such persons, if successful, are then in a position to bring in family members who may also, in turn, be welfare dependents. This situation may very well be worsened in the Irish state if the referendum proposals that involve an effective legal redefinition of what constitutes a family are passed in March – putting ‘durable relationships’ on par with marriage in establishing constitutional family significance though the State may be able to continue to define family relationships for immigration purposes.
One of the reasons the current EU Council and Commission, backed by a liberal-left Parliament, were anxious to have the Pact passed before June, is the fear that the political balance in the Parliament might shift. Tusk himself realises this, no more so than in Poland where any perceived weakness on immigration could quickly rebound to the advantage of PiS.
Likewise, parties who are in favour of taking a much harder line on illegal immigration, and who are opposed to the Pact, are forecast to do very well across most member states in the June elections. Ireland, for the present, remains an outlier in that all of the main parties and sitting MEPs are very much on the left liberal flank on this matter.