As the global security environment is transformed, Ireland’s defence policies are changing rapidly as well. Announcements are coming quick and fast.
Annual defence spending, says Tánaiste Simon Harris, should be more than doubled. The ‘Triple Lock’ – which prevents any deployment of more than a dozen Irish Defence Forces personnel on overseas missions without UN Security Council backing – is to be altered. Several of the Army’s ageing radar systems are likely to be donated to Ukraine.
Ireland is going to try to reach ‘Level of Ambition 3’ as set out in the ‘Report on the Commission on the Defence Forces.’
If that ambition is realised, the firepower the Defence Forces will possess will vastly exceed anything that they have previously had at their disposal.
It will include fighter jets, at least a dozen naval vessels and far more helicopters, including some “dedicated combat helicopter assets” to carry elite Army Rangers.[1]
For decades after the end of the Cold War, there was relative stability in Europe. That era has now ended.
Since the Second World War, the United States was willing to act as the guarantor of European security. That era has now ended.
Within the European community, Ireland previously had several important neutral counterparts like Sweden and Finland. That era has now ended, and a non-equipped and non-aligned Ireland increasingly looks like an anomaly.
The unspoken consensus within Ireland had long been that we could maintain an inadequate military for UN peacekeeping, ceremonial purposes and other domestic emergencies.
That era has also now ended, the coalition believes that the status quo is untenable, and so too does Sinn Féin, whose manifesto had also promised major spending increases to create “strong, adequately equipped Defence Forces.”[2]
Public opinion appears favourable too; a recent Business Post poll showed 45% of voters support increased defence spending, compared to the 27% who are opposed.[3]
Something is being missed in this blizzard of announcements.
The Taoiseach says Irish people are “blissfully unaware” of the fear which other European countries are experiencing.[4]
True enough, but the Irish people are also blissfully unaware of where his government is leading us: either because of Micheál’s unwillingness to say or else because he does not himself know.
Before we go further, the government should be asked some obvious questions.
Much of the security discussion focuses on what is happening off our coast or in the air. In particular, the fear that undersea cables would be severed is routinely invoked, given that 75% of all cables in the Northern Hemisphere pass through or near Irish waters.[5]
Ireland has been successful in expanding our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to a point where our marine territory is now 10 times the size of our entire island.[6]
What was the point in Ireland seeking to expand its marine territory if we are not in a position to monitor or secure it?
Reaching Level of Ambition 3 will mean acquiring more ships, but how many are needed to patrol this area? More to the point: what types of ships will need to be purchased?
Ireland’s existing fleet is made up of small offshore patrol vessels used for fisheries patrols and similar tasks.
If the goal is to secure the EEZ, will such vessels be able to carry out more sophisticated roles, or will we need to invest in the kind of Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance Ships (MROSS) which the Royal Navy is turning to?[7]
Even if the Naval Service has ships which can see what is happening underwater, that does not provide security.
It is one thing being able to spot a submarine lurking underwater, and quite another being able to sink it. A fisheries patrol ship is not a frigate and cannot do what a (far more expensive) frigate does.
Ireland could expand its military capabilities significantly, but still not be capable of dealing with threats on its own.
Right now, Ireland’s military can neither see what is happening above us (due to insufficient radar capabilities) and nor can it take any defensive actions (due to the lack of fighter aircraft).
Our government has repeatedly expressed its intention to acquire primary radar, but that does nothing to address the second part of that equation.
Being part of a defence alliance – whether it be NATO or an EU arrangement – allows a country to tap into a wider network of potential allies, who may have capabilities which you lack.
Being neutral means you have to do more alone, and pay for it – as Jennifer Carroll MacNeill rightly says, “[a]s a neutral country, you should, in fact, spend more on defence, not less on defence.”[8]
Where will the lines be in determining what price we are willing to pay in cash for having fully independent capabilities, and what price we are willing to pay in lost sovereignty for entering into partnerships?
Ending the Triple Lock will open the door to Irish troops taking part in peacekeeping (or peacemaking) missions which are likely to be more controversial and difficult than what we were previously involved in.
With NATO declining in importance, the EU is likely to do more, particularly in its own regional neighbourhood.
It would be unreasonable for the government to state at this point what those missions could entail, but the public is entitled to some sense of where Irish troops may be sent, and what they may be asked to do.
Instability and terrorism in the Sahel region of Africa is a topic of increasing importance. As northern African states totter, there are already multiple EU military and security missions underway in countries like Mali.[9]
The stakes are high in a region where Russia has its own interests and mercenaries; state collapse can result in an exodus of migrants heading towards Europe.
In general, do the Taoiseach and Tánaiste envision Irish troops playing a larger role in missions like this?
Would any such missions be limited to very specific goals in helping local partners, or is there a risk of the Afghanistan fiasco being replayed, with European soldiers trying to refashion backward societies in the vain hopes of making them democratic?
Up until now, Micheál Martin – who has been at the heart of Irish government decision-making in the years where our military was badly neglected, and is therefore partly responsible for the crisis today – has pursued a typically cowardly approach of failing to set out a vision for what the new Irish military might look like, and what it will be used to do.
The public consultation for the National Security Strategy was opened in 2019, with interested parties being asked to submit their thoughts about the major threats to Ireland and how the country should protect itself.[10]
It has been more than five years since the consultation closed, and still no Strategy has been published.
Instead of setting out clearly what the challenges are and how they are likely to be met, Micheál Martin has preferred to engage in stage managed democracy through the ‘Consultative Forum on International Security Policy’ while making piecemeal changes which give no indication as to where we are being led.
Irish people are willing to pay a price to keep their country safe.
They deserve better than to be kept in the dark by a government which refuses to communicate openly, while simultaneously lecturing their people about being ill-informed.
[1] Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces (2022) https://www.military.ie/en/public-information/publications/report-of-the-commission-on-defence-forces/report-of-the-commission-on-defence-forces.pdf
[2] Sinn Féin (2024) ‘The Choice for Change: General Election Manifesto 2024,’ https://vote.sinnfein.ie/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/SinnFeinManifesto2024.pdf
[3] Business Post (2025) ‘More voters back calls for upping defence spending in Ireland,’ https://www.businesspost.ie/politics/more-voters-back-calls-for-upping-defence-spending-in-ireland/
[4] Irish Examiner (2025) ‘’The Micheál Martin Interview: The ‘blissfully unaware’ are blind to the growing fear in EU states,’ https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/politics/arid-41570407.html
[5] RTE (2024) ‘Why Irish undersea cables are seen as potential military targets,’ https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2024/1120/1481913-undersea-cables-data-internet-ireland-europe-sabotage-military-attacks/
[6] Marine Institute (2022) ‘The Map of Ireland Is Bigger Than You Think,’ https://www.marine.ie/site-area/news-events/news/map-ireland-bigger-you-think
[7] European Security & Defence (2023) ‘UK’s First Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance Ship Enters Service,’ https://euro-sd.com/2023/10/news/34540/first-mross-enters-service/
[8] Independent.ie (2025) ‘Minister says Ireland ‘needs to double its spending on defence,’ and admits undersea cables and pipelines face threat,’ https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/minister-says-ireland-needs-to-double-its-spending-on-defence-and-admits-undersea-cables-and-pipelines-face-threat/a1327244783.html
[9] European Union External Action (2025) ‘Missions and Operations,’ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en
[10] Department of the Taoiseach (2019) ‘Public Consultation on the development of a National Security Strategy,’ https://www.gov.ie/en/consultation/8b3a62-public-consultation-on-the-development-of-a-national-security-strate/