Translation: The battle of Kiev is over, and, eh, we lost:
Russia’s deputy defense minister says Moscow has decided to “fundamentally cut back military activity in the direction of Kyiv and Chernigiv” in order to “increase mutual trust for future negotiations to agree and sign a peace deal with Ukraine.” pic.twitter.com/2qDYOzAzDp
— max seddon (@maxseddon) March 29, 2022
Some of the pro-Russian spin on this in the last 24 hours has bordered on the absurd: Go to pro-Kremin accounts on social media, and you’ll get some version of this was the plan all along, guys. In that version of reality, Putin’s march on Kiev was really a diversion, so he could tie down Ukrainian forces while he focused on his real goal all along, which was allegedly to seize only the Donbass region, which has had a pro-Russian separatist movement since 2014.
But that doesn’t make sense at all. Because if those were his goals, then surely the fastest way to achieve them would simply have been to seize Kiev, and other key Ukrainian cities, and force the Ukrainians to negotiate. Had he accomplished that in the first few days, then the Donbass would be Russia’s by now – along with whatever else he wanted to take.
But no – we’re now expected to believe that he never intended to take Kiev at all, and instead committed 100,000 men, vast numbers of tanks and other equipment, to a blood-stained diversion. The whole thing has a strong “Baghdad Bob” feel to it, with every Russian reversal being met by frantic efforts by western Putin-admirers to insist that no, this was really the plan all along, and all will be well so long as we let the great man’s plan unfold over time. Trust ye in the Leader, etc, etc.
But of course there’s one other thing that makes no sense. Because if it was a diversion – why withdraw? If the forces around Kiev are now needed in the East, then by definition, the diversion plan failed by weakening the eastern attack. And as they withdraw, so too will Ukrainian forces around Kiev be able to thin their lines and move east – by a shorter route – to meet them. What, really, was accomplished, except the loss of life? You may wish, for whatever reason, to believe Putin some kind of Chess Grandmaster, but on this occasion, it seems to me that he’s tried a wayward queen attack, and come off second best.
It’s important not to be too optimistic about Ukraine’s military prospects: The Russian Army is still – even in its present somewhat tattered state – a formidable fighting force, and, in recent days, the Kremlin has pivoted to a more achievable military strategy. It is quite possible that sheer brute force will allow the Russians to seize Donetsk and Luhansk in the east, as per this new “minimalist goals” spin, and establish that long-desired land bridge to Crimea. Those are goals which are achievable, and could probably be defended, though the Ukrainians will fight them all the way.
On the other hand, it’s increasingly clear that this war will not end with the subjugation of Ukraine or the establishment of any kind of puppet Government in Kiev. Nor is it possible to “denazify” Ukraine – the official goal of the operation, remember – without doing just that.
It’s not especially hard to see all of the problems that the Russians are facing: Some contrarians have been pointing in recent days to a restoration of the value of the ruble as evidence that sanctions are not biting, but that’s very misleading: The value of the ruble these days is based on tiny volumes of trading conducted almost entirely within Russia. The Government, for example, has instructed the big energy companies to buy rubles, propping the value of the currency up. That’s sustainable in the short term, but not in the longer term.
On the military front, the situation might even be worse for the Russians than it looks: While the Russians trumpet every minor advance, they have proved entirely incapable of taking cities or major population centres. Even Mariopol – bombed into dust – remains contested, despite having been besieged for a month. The northern offensive around Kiev has been going backwards, presumably explaining the announcement above. The Donbass, in other words, is not even close to being secured. That explains the withdrawal.
My colleague Thade Andy is amongst those with a different view on this, writing this morning with a much more rosier view on these matters for the Russians, and claiming that the war is “unwinnable” for Ukraine.
He’s probably right, in the sense that a military victory of the traditional kind is not imaginable. That would involve pushing the Russians out of Ukraine entirely, and invading Russia itself. Not only is that impossible, but it would likely result in Russian Nuclear weapons being used before any major Russian city was threatened. But military victory isn’t necessary for Ukraine: The costs of the war are far greater for the Russians, and they, too, will find military victory almost impossible.
What, after all, does a Russian military victory look like? Without taking Kiev, no such victory exists. While the Ukrainians hold their capital and most of their lands, the Russians have two choices: Keep fighting, or negotiate.
Those negotiations can only really end in defeat for Putin. Even if he were to achieve modest goals, like, say, the annexation of Donetsk and Luhansk. The bottom line is that with that outcome the pre-war situation would remain mostly unchanged. Ukraine would be independent – still lead by the “nazis” in Kiev – and vastly more pro-Western than it is today. The hated Azov battalion will still exist, except now it will be battle hardened, and probably eager to conduct, eh, freelance, operations in Russian-occupied Ukraine. Ukraine meanwhile will receive military aid in the billions for the years to come. It may well be welcomed into the European Union. It does not need to be in NATO to be a major western ally in the region, even if it is officially neutral. Russia, by invading, will have created a pro-western state with a battle-hardened army, right on its exposed southern flank.
In retrospect, the whole operation looks like a shambles: 200,000 men is a large force, but it was never going to be enough to conquer a country of 40million people. The Americans, remember, were not able to hold Iraq – having to retreat inside a “green zone” in Baghdad – with nearly three times that many soldiers, and better equipment. Russia has managed to advance no more than 100 miles in all directions, at the price of severe sanctions, heavy losses, and a crushing blow to their image as a military superpower.
There are now only two possible outcomes: A negotiated settlement in which Ukraine retains its independence, and present government, or a long, drawn out, bloody war. Both outcomes will represent a humiliation for Moscow. But one of them means fewer dead Russian soldiers, so, hopefully, that’s the one Mr. Putin will choose.