Being, as I am, interested in the views of readers of this website, I do my best to read every email and comment sent to me – though it simply is not possible to reply to every one. Reading those comments and emails, when they pertain to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, is an eye-opening experience. Suffice to say, that while polls show that the broad swathe of Irish public opinion remains much more sympathetic to Ukraine than Russia, there is a significant minority of people who passionately feel either that Ireland and Europe should be wholly neutral, or that our sympathies are misplaced and should lie with the Russians.
The stated arguments for this position generally fall into a couple of categories: Much as critics of Israel say that the latest war “did not start on October 7th”, so too do critics of Ukraine note that the latest war did not start in 2022, but has been ongoing since the Ukrainian revolution of 2013, which saw pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych flee the country after he had vetoed the EU-Ukraine association agreement. These events precipitated pro-Russian protests in the far east of Ukraine, and led to the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea. In this version of history, Ukrainian democracy was thwarted in a “coup” and Russia is actually defending Ukraine from what amounted to an anti-democratic takeover.
The less pro-Russian argument tends to simply be the pacifist position: That the west has no business sending arms outside its borders to facilitate the deaths of tens of thousands of young Russians and Ukrainians – that the proper position is one of sympathy and pleas for peace. This is the position advocated increasingly by populists in Ireland who want to retain some credibility with the moderate centre ground – nobody ever lost votes arguing for a “negotiated settlement” to a war, after all.
In the interviews I have been conducting with EU election candidates, most of whom could be categorised as populists or alternative candidates, a common answer to two questions has been provided by everyone other than Peter Casey, who is avowedly pro-Ukrainian: Each of the others thinks we have been taking too many Ukrainians; Each of them also thinks that the EU should cease funding the Ukrainian war effort (though some, to be fair, have been open to continued non-military, humanitarian aid).
The problem, needless to say, is that these two positions are in contradiction.
There are a couple of basic facts that we need to consider. First, the EU and Ukraine share a lengthy border: Ukraine is bordered on the west by Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova (which is not an EU member but has free movement with Romania).
Second, the easiest way to achieve a negotiated settlement for either belligerent is for them to either win the war outright, or make it abundantly clear that they are about to win the war. Ukraine is self-evidently more likely to negotiate with Russian tanks in the outskirts of Kiev than it is with the Russians making slow progress in the East. Thus from a Russian perspective a militarily weakened Ukraine invites not negotiations, but a greater commitment to advancing. Anything else would be illogical – even if you’re somebody who believes that Russia’s ambitions are ultimately quite modest.
Third, Russian advances are likely to create a wave of additional refugees. This latter point is simply obvious: Many Ukrainians who have stayed behind in Ukraine will have done so because they believe their country will ultimately triumph, or failing that, survive. A collapse in one of Ukraine’s front lines and a rapid Russian advance is likely to send an absolute wave of additional refugees towards the EU’s borders.
Combining these three factors, it is difficult not to see the populist position as being inherently illogical: A defeated Ukraine is much more likely to see several million additional Ukrainians flee that country. A victorious Ukraine is much more likely to see a substantial number of refugees return to that country.
Further, the stated aim of seeking negotiations with Russia over peace can not logically be combined with a commitment to no longer aiding the Ukrainian war effort, for the simple reason that basic game theory would indicate that it is always best to negotiate with a strengthening enemy, not a weakening one. The Russians are not incentivised, by a militarily abandoned Ukraine, to negotiate. They are incentivised to advance and win. Ironically, the cause for peace is vastly strengthened by the strongest possible Ukrainian military: The Russians have no incentive to negotiate while they believe they can ultimately win, and every incentive to negotiate if they believe victory is beyond them for the foreseeable future.
Mind you, populists are not the only ones with a conundrum or a contradiction in their position: Europe is in the bizarre position of funding the Ukrainian war effort while also harbouring a great number of military age Ukrainians who have, in effect, fled from their duty to fight that war for their country. Thus Europe is at once draining Ukraine’s manpower while replenishing its weaponry. This is a contradiction the Ukrainians themselves have noted, which is why they are now seeking aid in “repatriating” people who might effectively be called “draft dodgers”.
For populists, however, the conundrum is greater: The risk with Ukrainian defeat is an untold number of million Ukrainians heading for the EU’s borders, where (due to the sheer length of that border) the majority would make it to Europe. Thus the “abandon Ukraine” and “reduce migration” policies they espouse are in contradiction to each other.
This is not a problem, frankly, that is going to have to be addressed in the next EU parliament since the smart money is on that parliament retaining a pro-Ukrainian majority of members. It should also be said that for most voters, drawing a connection between these two competing problems isn’t something that they will worry themselves about – most populists will vote on the immigration issue first, and think less about the war other than in broad terms about the desirability of peace. Yet, should populists find themselves unexpectedly in a position of power, this contradiction on Ukraine, perhaps more than anything else, has the potential to cause them significant political difficulty in the years ahead.