The most hotly-debated foreign policy topic today is Russia’s war against Ukraine. The consensus which existed when Russia launched its all-out invasion in 2022 has broken down, in large part due to the lamentable decision of many American conservatives to withdraw their support from the Ukrainian defenders. Worryingly, among right-leaning people in Ireland and elsewhere, this tendency to oppose aid to Ukraine is growing. Some questions to those who are opposed to helping Ukraine may help to clarify matters.
Q1. Why do you think stopping military aid to Ukraine will stop Russia’s military?
To the Trump administration and some others, the solution now is clear: cease military support to Ukraine, and the war will end. This view extends well beyond the right, with the Sinn Féin election manifesto stating that “[a]ll sides must cease the current unlimited supply of weapons into Ukraine,”[1] as if all sides were responsible.
Forget the question of moral culpability. What evidence is there that disarming Ukraine will make Russia pull back? Russian attacks are escalating in ferocity; days before President Zelensky flew to Washington, the Russians launched their largest drone attack thus far.[2] Large-scale US and other Western aid to Ukraine has helped the Ukrainian military to keep a numerically superior invader at bay since the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2022.
There is an obvious likely effect of starving Ukraine’s military of resources – Russia will gain more ground and ultimately win the war through brute attrition. If anti-Ukraine voices want this to happen, they should be honest enough to say so, or else they should lay out an alternative explanation of what will happen.
Q2. Why are Ukrainian war aims a stumbling block to peace, but Russian war aims aren’t?
At the heart of the Western anti-Western critique is the view that Zelensky, not Putin, is the obstacle to peace, and that his war aim of driving Russia back to the previous borders and achieving some kind of security guarantee is what is dragging this conflict out. Granted, driving Russia back to the 2014 borders seems unrealistic, but it is still unreasonable to expect Ukraine’s leader to agree to cede territory before a peace negotiation begins. There are signs, also, that more Ukrainians are coming to believe that a settlement involving some loss of territory is an acceptable price for peace.[3]
Yet the anti-Ukraine crowd have nothing to say about the unreasonable nature of Russian war aims, namely: that Russia should keep the land it has stolen since 2022, that it should be given large swathes of territory that its army has failed to occupy on the battlefield, and that Ukraine be denied any security guarantee to prevent another invasion – not just that they should not be allowed to join NATO, but that the presence of European peacekeepers also be ruled out too.[4]
Ukraine’s war aim is to defend Ukraine, Russia’s war aim is to destroy Ukraine. It is not hard to see the difficulty this presents in arranging a ceasefire, let alone a peace treaty.
Q3. Why do you think that the current Russian military position cannot be changed?
It is indeed hard to drive an entrenched enemy back; one of the few things the Russian army does well is construct defences. At the same time, the trajectory of many wars has changed significantly after a period that long or longer. Three years into WW2, German military mountaineers were climbing Caucasian peaks for fun. Three years into WW1, Germany was about to knock Russia out of the war. More than three years into the American Civil War, Grant and Lee were slugging it out in the eastern theatre, and President Lincoln was at risk of losing the presidency to a candidate likely to appease the Confederacy and end the war on the slave owners’ terms.
Leaving aside the extreme narcissism of outsiders telling Ukraine that they are sick of helping them for this long, there are other reasons to still hope for Russia’s defeat. This war has not been static. In the first year, the Russian advance was stopped, and Russia was flung back from its positions in the north. In the second year, a Russian army mutiny shook Putin’s regime to its core. In the third year, Ukraine took the war to Russian soil, while Russia had to turn to North Korea to make up for the losses it had endured. Russia’s economy appears to be in real difficulty, and staying the course makes sense.
Q4. Why are post-Cold War broken promises a factor except for the Russian ones?
A common refrain from the Russia apologists is that the West is responsible for breaking the various assurances made to Russia about NATO not expanding eastwards after the Cold War. It does appear that such assurances were privately given,[5] but it is also true that Russian misbehaviour in the 90s and then under Vladimir Putin changed the security situation to the point that central and eastern European countries needed to join NATO to protect themselves.
More importantly though, those who wail about a verbal agreement being breached have nothing to say about the Budapest Memorandum, the international and legally binding agreement which the Russians signed with Ukraine in 1994. Russia pledged not to threaten force – let alone use force – against Ukraine, while Ukraine relinquished thousands of nuclear weapons it had inherited from the old USSR.[6] America, Britain and France, in turn, promised to provide help if Ukraine were attacked by Russia.
Russia cannot act like the aggrieved party here. Perhaps Soviet and Russian diplomats were misled by Western ones. Diplomats lie sometimes, on behalf of their masters. Russia vapourising the Budapest Memorandum is far more serious.
Q5. Why does Russia get a veto on what organisations a neighbour can join?
Similar to the crocodile tears about NATO enlargement, a related claim is that it is wrong for Russia’s neighbours to join NATO, the EU or any other organisation that the Kremlin dislikes. ‘Mexico would not be allowed to join the Warsaw Pact,’ they cry. In fact, Mexico should indeed be able to align with Russia without answering to the United States. The important difference is that only the world’s few tinpot dictatorships actually want a Russian alliance: Belarus, North Korea, Venezuela and so on.
If Russia has a veto on other countries’ decisions, what are the criteria for how it exercises this power? What is the full list of countries which must heed the Tsar’s demands, and what other countries are also afforded a sphere of influence? Ireland is English-speaking, has a political system based on the Westminster model and is much smaller than the neighbouring UK. Should we be allowed to be in the EU, given the practical difficulties this has presented Britain with? Should we be allowed to not be in NATO? You either believe in the age of empires, or you do not. Republicans and nationalists should not.
Q6. Why do you think that supporting Ukraine defending itself is like intervening in Iraq/Afghanistan?
The anti-Ukraine views of American conservatives largely stems from the disastrous failures of Western interventions in recent decades. The native working-class which bore the brunt of the fighting is embodied in the new American Vice President, who asked ‘Have we learned nothing?’ when his fellow US senators passed a Ukrainian aid package last year.[7]
This is not a comparison of apples and oranges, but one of complete opposites. The Iraqi and Afghan war were waged to change those countries’ political and social systems from outside; Ukraine is fighting to prevent its political and social system from being forcibly changed. Around 3,600 American and coalition troops died in Afghanistan; no American or other NATO soldier has died in Ukraine. Ukraine’s army has stopped the advance of a much larger and better-armed adversary; Afghanistan’s military folded in the face of a smaller and less well-armed Taliban. Ukraine has used American weapons to wreck the Russian military; Afghan trainees frequently used their weapons to murder their American trainers.
The war to defend Ukraine is above all a war of realism, rather than being one of the idealistic crusades launched by execrable characters like George Bush, Tony Blair and David Cameron.
Q7. Why do you think America had the power to remove a Ukrainian government in 2014?
Russia’s enablers tell an interesting story about the origins of the war, one in which America deposed the Ukrainian President Yanukovych in 2014, at which point a provoked Putin had no choice but to intervene. Forget that Yanukovych had torn up a popular association agreement with the EU (not NATO) under orders from Moscow, and that Yanukovych’s authorities massacred around 100 civilians during the popular uprising which followed.[8] The more important point is that America’s critics have a vastly higher estimation of American abilities than anyone in the Pentagon has. Since the 1950s, Cuba has survived as an American adversary less than 100 miles away from Florida. Iran’s Ayatollahs are similarly durable. If the Ukrainian people did not want to change the Ukrainian government in 2014, then it would not have changed.
America did indeed try to influence internal Ukrainian politics very blatantly in days gone by. In 1991, President George H.W. Bush went to Kiev and encouraged a newly-liberalised Ukrainian society not to break away from the Soviet Union. A few months later, the Ukrainians gave Bush and the Russians the same message when 92% voted for independence in a free election, including majorities in the primarily Russian-speaking regions of Crimea and the Donbas.[9]
Then and now, Ukraine is Ukraine, not America’s puppet.
Q8. Why is Russian imperialism not deplorable, and why is Ukrainian nationalism not commendable?
In 2023, the Europe correspondent for The Irish Times Naomi O’Leary asked Michael D. Higgins if he saw Russia as a colonial power. A typically long-winded answer followed, touching upon European imperialism, the unfairness of the West and the wickedness of capitalism. “I was left with the impression that my question had not been answered. Though perhaps, indirectly, it had,” O’Leary wrote.[10]
Russia is the world’s largest country, with the ethnic Russians acquiring that territory by conquering other ethnic groups over many centuries. Since WW2, the Soviets/Russians have occupied large parts of Europe, they have crushed nationalist uprisings by Hungarians (1956), Czechs and Slovaks (1968) and Poles (1981, carried out by proxy). They occupied part of Moldova, expanded their occupation of Georgia (2008) and invaded Ukraine (2014). If it be a sin to covet others’ land, then Russia is the most offending nation of all.
Many Ukraine critics consider themselves nationalists. But in recent years, Ukraine has adopted a strong policy favouring the Ukrainian language, teaching Ukrainian history (including the horrors of Soviet oppression) and ensuring that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is based in Kiev, not Moscow. When a massive army surrounded Ukraine on three sides in 2022 and provided an ultimatum, the Ukrainian people collectively grabbed their weapons and said ‘not today.’ How could anyone not admire them?
Q9. Why is repeated Russian aggression against Ireland not a cause for opposing it internationally?
Ireland can hardly be neutral towards Russia when Russia is anything but friendly towards Ireland. As the retired Vice Admiral Mark Mellett says, Russian responsibility for the massive cyber attack on the HSE in 2021 is “undeniable.”[11] It is more than possible that Irish patients died as a result of the major disruption it caused. The following year, Russia announced that they would hold missile tests within our Exclusive Economic Zone, regardless of the impact that might have. In the recent past, Russian diplomats have forged Irish passports for spying purposes,[12] and Russian aircraft have violated Irish airspace.[13]
Leaving aside the immorality of Russians actions and intentions in Ukraine, they can have no complaint that Ireland has been contributing to Ukraine’s defence. Taking this action is a demonstration of one of the less appreciated aspects of statecraft: payback.
Q10. Why is nuclear blackmail acceptable when Russians practice it?
A curious cognitive dissonance becomes evident when Russophiles discuss the potential escalation of war. Those who think well of Russia (culturally, religiously or what have you) also constantly warn that Russia could use nuclear weapons to incinerate millions of human beings. Just as Trump barked at Zelensky, they say: ‘You’re gambling with World War Three!’
There are nine nations on earth which have nuclear weapons. It says a great deal about Russia as a country that few people ever expect any of the other eight countries to use them. It says even more about Russia that they repeatedly, loudly and proudly threaten to do just that. There have been over 130 such threats since the war began,[14] with the usual pattern being that Russia begins to speak about nuclear war whenever they do not want Ukraine to get a particular type of support, and then does nothing when the Ukrainians receive it.
Wisdom demands the retention of a nuclear deterrent; human decency precludes its use. Apart from when it comes to Russia, this is almost universally understood. Not even the most ardent keffiyeh wearers actually expects that Israel will nuke Gaza. In 1982, there was never any prospect that Margaret Thatcher would lob an atom bomb at Buenos Aires, and nor would she have threatened it. Russia’s nuclear sabre-rattling should be taken seriously only in the sense that it shows why Russia is a rogue and despicable Mafia state.
Q11. Why are the handful of Western pro-Russia academics/experts taken so seriously?
Being themselves devoid of knowledge, Russia’s online apologists seek to find any articulate voice who can make a senseless argument appear plausible. In the University of Chicago’s Professor John Mearsheimer, they have found a moderately significant academic to be their champion. A video of Mearsheimer blaming the West for Russia’s initial 2014 invasion is routinely shared, posted and tweeted by the strange coalition of Communists, traitors, West-hating peaceniks, reactionary conservatives, closet racists and contrarian cranks who make up the pro-Russia internet coalition.
There is no point in debunking the nonsense Mearsheimer says. It would not convince those who share his speeches, the great majority of whom know nothing about him or his academic work other than that he blames the West. What is remarkable is that those who lionise Mearsheimer, Jeffrey Sachs and the few others like them is that they make no pretence of examining the views of the vast legion of experienced academics, journalists, politicians and senior military officials who say the exact opposite. For every Mearsheimer, there are multiple academics and writers of similar (or much greater) standing who acknowledge the scale of the threat Russia poses, and why they must be faced down.
Think of: Stephen Kotkin, who has written the magisterial biography volumes on Stalin; or Timothy Snyder, author of outstanding books on eastern Europe; or the thoroughly Russophile Anne Applebaum, who exhaustively researched Stalin’s crimes when it was still possible to speak the truth in Russia; or the Trump-supporting Niall Ferguson. The list goes on and on.
Mearsheimer is greatly outnumbered in his own field for the same reason that the pro-Russia side are still outnumbered in virtually all Western societies. A healthy intellectual environment exposes falsehoods, and the moral confusion which now exists on Ukraine is a sign of just how diseased our societies have become.
[1] Sinn Féin (2024) ‘The Choice for Change: General Election Manifesto 2024,’ https://vote.sinnfein.ie/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/SinnFeinManifesto2024.pdf
[2] POLITICO (2025) ‘Russia unleashes biggest drone attack of Ukraine war on eve of anniversary,’ https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-largest-drone-attack-ukraine-war-anniversary/
[3] Asia Times (2024) ‘Ukrainians increasingly willing to cede land for peace: survey,’ https://asiatimes.com/2024/09/ukrainians-increasingly-willing-to-cede-land-for-peace-survey/#
[4] TASS (2025) ‘Russia sees no ground for compromise on EU military deployment in Ukraine – Lavrov,’ https://tass.com/politics/1923397
[5] National Security Archive (2017) ‘National Security Archive,’ https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early
[6] Kyiv Independent (2024) ’30 years ago today, Ukraine traded nuclear arms for security assurances, a decision that still haunts Kyiv today,’ https://kyivindependent.com/30-years-ago-ukraine-traded-nuclear-arms-for-security-assurances-a-decision-that-haunts-kyiv-today/
[7] POLITICO (2024) ‘The Forever Wars Were a Mistake. Supporting Ukraine Is Not.’ https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/09/09/jd-vance-ukraine-iraq-war-00177535
[8] United Nations (2019) ‘Briefing note Accountability for Killings and Violent Deaths during the Maidan protests,’ https://ukraine.un.org/en/108759-briefing-note-accountability-killings-and-violent-deaths-during-maidan-protests
[9] Taipei Times (2023) ‘No more ‘Chicken Kiev’ for Ukraine,’ https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2023/01/01/2003791766
[10] The Irish Times (2023) ‘’Why don’t many on the left see Russia as a colonial power?’ https://www.irishtimes.com/world/europe/2023/10/19/why-dont-many-on-the-left-see-russia-as-a-colonial-power/
[11] RTE.ie (2025) ‘Former Defence Forces chief says Irish ‘neutrality is a myth,’ https://www.rte.ie/news/primetime/2025/0306/1500624-former-defence-forces-chief-says-irish-neutrality-is-a-myth/
[12] RTE.ie (2011) ‘Russian diplomat expelled over fake passports,’ https://www.rte.ie/news/2011/0201/297213-passport/
[13] RTE.ie (2020) ‘Why are Russian military flying in Irish controlled airspace?’ https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2020/0320/1123836-russian-military-aircraft-bombers-ireland/
[14] VOA (2024) ‘Putin claims Russia is not engaged in nuclear saber-rattling; VOA counts 135 nuclear threats in 3 years,’ https://www.voanews.com/a/putin-claims-russia-is-not-engaged-in-nuclear-saber-rattling-voa-counts-135-nuclear-threats-in-3-years-/7908649.html