The world has been lucky in one respect: As bad as the conflict in Ukraine has been, it could be, and could yet become, much worse. The outrage at Russia’s invasion is understandable, and still growing. Footage of yesterday’s missile strike in the centre of Kharkhiv, for example, is not winning Russia any friends, or sympathisers. Nor, frankly, is Russia doing much to help its cause: Sergei Lavrov’s statement yesterday that Russia was “de-nazifying” Ukraine, and preventing the country from being “forced into NATO against its will” was, to be frank, at the level of fantasy propaganda.
Absolutely shocking via @maria_avdv – missile strike on the administration building in Kharkiv.
It’s right in the centre of the city and is a beautiful example of post-war architecture, recently renovated.
Protecting Russian speakers and culture…
— Shaun Walker (@shaunwalker7) March 1, 2022
Nobody expects a NATO intervention, militarily, in Ukraine, and such an action would be incredibly dangerous. And yet, it is notable that there is growing popular support for that in some NATO countries. Not yet a majority, but an increasingly emboldened minority.
It is easy to be alarmist about the present crisis. Anybody can talk up the chances of a wider conflict, and the risk of nuclear weapons. But it is also very easy to play down the danger: Russia has gambled an awful lot on winning this war, and the consequences of not winning it could yet be fatal for the man in the Kremlin. Victory – or, at minimum, the appearance of victory – is an imperative for Mr. Putin.
The costs of the war have already been very high for Russia, and for Russians. Whatever happens, it is unlikely that western leaders will ever trust Mr. Putin again. The economic legacy of the measures taken against Russia will take months to be fully felt and may take years to recover from. The problem is, in short, that he has already lost much of what he stood to lose by commencing this invasion.
Since the war began, there has been consistent optimism in the west about what the ultimate outcome might be: Regime change, not in Ukraine, but in Moscow. Acres of coverage have been devoted to the idea that, faced with sanctions and pariah status, the oligarchs in Russia might decide to quietly take Putin off the board. But that ignores that even were such an event to happen – and it’s much easier said than done – any new Russian President would immediately face the enormous problem of cleaning up this mess. A unilateral surrender and withdrawal from Ukraine at this point would cause Russia almost as many problems as the war has: It would likely mean, in short order, a Ukraine in NATO, and possibly the EU. The Russians, too, might legitimately fear consequences directed against their separatists in the Donbass region.
It is worth remembering that Russia is not just another country. In military, if not economic terms, it remains a superpower. It has never been successfully invaded. It has a massive stockpile of nuclear weapons. Morally, giving the Russians an inch on Ukraine is outrageous. Practically, it might be the only sensible course.
Russia’s stated aim in this conflict is threefold: To protect its citizens in the Donbass region, who it claims suffer under Ukrainian oppression. To stop NATO from extending through Ukrainian membership, and threatening Russia’s borders. And to “de-nazify” Ukraine and disarm it, so it is not a threat to Russia.
The third, obviously, is a non-negotiable fantasy. If Ukraine is to remain independent, then it must retain the right to elect its own Government, and provide for its own defence. But pragmatically, there should be room for negotiation on Russia’s two other aims.
It is not obvious what strategic interest either the west, or Ukraine, would have, in fighting a long war against Russian separatists in two eastern provinces. That conflict has gone on for seven years already, de-stabilising Ukraine, and costing needless lives. If a majority of people in those two provinces really want to be Russian, then is it really beyond the pale to offer them a referendum – with international observers – to decide their own fate? Is that a red line we are not willing to cross, for the sake of peace?
And as for the NATO element, surely a compromise can be worked out: A Ukrainian pledge of military neutrality, in return for significant western aid to improve and modernise its own military forces, such that it can deter any future Russian aggression?
Perhaps these proposals would not satisfy the Russians. But they do offer a way out: Putin could claim to have achieved something meaningful in his war, and a western retreat, without the west having given up anything that it presently has.
The alternative to a negotiated settlement of this war is not pretty. The best case scenario for Putin, as I wrote yesterday, is a bloody victory in Ukraine, followed by a bloody and costly occupation of Ukraine, while he faces significant western sanction. It is very clear that the war has been a major blunder. If there is some chance for a negotiated settlement, galling as it might be, then the west has a duty to try and find it.