In 1995, Quebec held a referendum on whether to secede from Canada. The vote was incredibly close, with 49.42% of Quebecers voting in favour of independence and 50.58% opposing it – a margin of just 1.16%. In the fallout from the referendum, Jacques Parizeau, the then premier of Quebec and a prominent leader of the pro-independence Parti Québécois, claimed that the referendum was lost due to “des votes ethniques” – “The Ethnic Vote.”
While Parizeau’s comments likely reflected a widespread frustration among the ethnic French population of Quebec, his remarks were widely condemned for drawing a distinction between the ethnic French population, “les Québécois de souche”, and the “other”. The irony of this backlash however is that Parizeau was correct. Polling suggests that while a significant majority of the ethnic Québécois supported independence, anglophones and allophones opposed it at a rate of 95%.
At the time of Parizeau’s comments, French speakers made up 80% of Quebec’s population. By 2021, this figure had fallen to 74%. During the same period of time, the proportion of anglophones and allophones grew from 25% to 28%. Likewise, support for Quebec’s independence has fallen to around 30%.
Since the British conquest in 1760, there have been concentrated efforts to preserve ethnic French culture and identity in Quebec, which evolved into a political movement for sovereignty in the 1960s. The tragedy of the failure of Quebec’s referendum in 1995 is that it appears to have precipitated a decline in French Canadian culture. A study by the Office Québécois de la Langue Française found a significant decline in the use of French among Quebecers. Among those aged 18 to 34, only 58% used French at work in 2023, down from 64% in 2010. The study also revealed that few Quebecers use French in their digital activities, and nearly a quarter of students from French high schools opt to attend English-language colleges.
If Parizeau’s assessment of the failed referendum campaign holds true, it seems that the aspiration of the Quebecois for independence is becoming increasingly intangible.
Perhaps, learning from the example of Quebec, in the run up to Scotland’s independence referendum a concerted effort was made to court the non-ethnic Scottish vote. Pro-independence campaigners set up groups such as ‘Scots Asians for Yes’, ‘English People for Scottish Independence’ and ‘EU Citizens for Independence’. In the lead up to voting day, Alex Salmon asserted ‘I’m absolutely confident that whatever else happens, the majority of Africans, the majority of Asians, the majority of people who come from a variety of Scotlands will vote yes to independence’ They didn’t.
While panel surveys conducted by the University of Edinburgh indicate that the ‘New Scot’ vote was more divided than that of their Quebecer counterparts, they still opposed independence at a higher rate than ‘Old Scots.’ The study found that 57% of New Scots were against independence, whereas polling at time suggested approximately 50% of those born in Scotland supported independence. Of the “New Scots” born in England, in particular, support for independence was as low as 20%.
In the case of Ireland, the numbers are more reflective of Quebec’s experience than Scotland’s more marginal difference. A 2020 LucidTalk poll found that 43% of natives supported Irish reunification, whereas only 19% of those born outside Britain and Ireland supported unity. The North of Ireland has experienced a comparably lower rate of inward migration in comparison to neighbouring jurisdictions, with migrants making up 6% of the total population. However, as demographics shift, and those that identify as Irish make up a larger section of the northern population, the migrant population will increasingly hold the balance in any future border poll – and they’re breaking heavily against unity.
The precedents of Quebec and Scotland should be particularly worrying for those of us in favour of Irish Unity. The case of Scotland shows that, even if you make a highly concerted effort, it’s harder to convince individuals with a migrant background of independence than it is to convince natives. Likewise, the example of Quebec shows that not only will this demographic problem become worse, but it has the potential to sap enthusiasm out of an independence campaign.
The tendency of individuals with a migrant background to vote against independence referenda is likely driven by an apathy to the emotional side of the debate, which results in a reluctance to embrace the risks associated with supporting independence. There is a parallel of this apathy towards national ambitions in the south as well, with diversity causing problems in terms of language revival. Earlier this month, Dr Matt Tracey, wrote in Gript that classroom diversity was causing a dramatic increase in Irish language exceptions.
Independence campaigners should consider that since migrant groups first came from Scotland and England to the North of Ireland in 1606, over the interceding 400 years, we have not convinced them of Irish Unity. Despite the new migrant populations in the North of Ireland expected to grow in the coming years, this week the Tánaiste has claimed that he doesn’t expect a border poll this decade. However, it might be too late in the next.
Dean Céitinn